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 A POST-KSR CONSIDERATION OF GENE PATENTS: 
THE “OBVIOUS TO TRY” STANDARD LIMITS THE 
PATENTABILITY OF GENES 
The information encoded in your DNA determines your 
unique biological characteristics, such as sex, eye color, age, 
and Social Security number. 
Dave Barry
1
 
 
I have a hunch that the unknown sequences of DNA will 
decode into copyright notices and patent protections. 
Donald E. Knuth
2
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
There are approximately 20,000 patents involving genes.
3
  For example, 
―[n]ine patents have been applied for on the genes which determine your 
eyeball, 40 on those for your heart, and no fewer than 152 on a single grain of 
rice.‖4  However, scholars and practitioners often question the scope and 
validity of gene patents on the grounds that genes are so essential for any 
being and so important to basic research that it is unethical to grant a private 
monopoly on them and that gene patents may hinder important research.
5
 
These arguments against gene patents generally aim to overturn court 
precedent or to advocate new legislation.
6
  This Note aims to reevaluate the 
validity and the scope of gene patents under a decision by the United States 
Supreme Court in 2007—KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.7 
In KSR, the Court analyzed the tests for an important requirement for 
 
1. Thinkexist.com, 
http://thinkexist.com/search/searchquotation.asp?search=dna&q=author%3A%22Dave+Barry%22 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2009).  Dave Barry is a famous humorist.  
2. HitXP: Biology Quotes Zone, http://www.hitxp.com/quotes/bio.htm (last visited Dec. 2, 
2009).  Donald E. Knuth is a famous computer scientist at Stanford University.  He authored the 
seminal multivolume work, THE ART OF COMPUTER PROGRAMMING.  He is regarded as the father of 
the analysis of algorithms. 
3. Andrew W. Torrance, After the Gene Rush, BIO-IT WORLD, Nov. 2002, at 80. 
4. Editorial, Leader: Whose Life is it Anyway?: The Knowledge Economy Should Be for All, 
GUARDIAN (Manchester, U.K.), Nov. 15, 2000, at 23, http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2000/ 
nov/15/genetics.guardianleaders. 
5. See infra Part III.C. 
6. See infra Part III.C. 
7. KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  
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patentability—the nonobviousness requirement.8  This decision effectively 
encourages challenges to patent validity based on nonobviousness; cases that 
raised a nonobviousness challenge nearly doubled in 2008, compared to the 
number of the cases from the three previous years.
9
  Furthermore, KSR seems 
to make it harder for a patent to survive a nonobviousness challenge; in cases 
that raised a nonobviousness challenge, 30% fewer patentees prevailed in 
2008, compared to those that prevailed over the three previous years.
10
  This 
Note focuses on the effect of the KSR decision on a specific class of patents: 
gene patents. 
In Part II, this Note outlines the criteria by which an invention qualifies 
for patent protection.  Part III presents the current rationales for granting gene 
patents and summarizes arguments and efforts to limit or ban such patents.  
Part IV reviews the tests for the nonobviousness requirement as reiterated in 
the KSR decision and further illustrated in several post-KSR cases.  Based on 
an analysis of these cases, this Note argues that the ―obvious to try‖ standard 
revived by the Court in KSR challenges some basic rationales of gene 
patenting and that the adoption of this standard by lower courts suggests a 
reconsideration in the judicial branch of gene patentability.  Finally, in Part V, 
this Note proposes that, as a result of KSR, the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) should modify its standard for granting patents 
on genes.  This Note lays out the criteria by which only Deoxyribonucleic 
acid (DNA) molecules that are discovered by a new strategy, assigned a new 
function, or modified by a new method would be patentable.  These criteria 
comport with the Court‘s KSR decision and promote basic research. 
II.  USPTO GRANTS PATENT PROTECTION ON  
NEW AND USEFUL INVENTIONS 
The patent system of the United States is based on the Patent Act.
11
  
Congress enacted the Patent Act ―[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right 
to their respective . . . Discoveries.‖12  Under the Patent Act, the USPTO 
examines applications from inventors and renders a decision as to 
patentability primarily pursuant to sections 101–103.13 
 
8. Id.  For more on patentability requirements, see infra Part II. 
9. John T. Aquino, Biotech, Pharma Patents Said Less Affected than Others by High Court’s 
Decision in KSR, 76 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 429 (July 25, 2008).  This report claims 
that the impact of KSR on biotech patents will not be as noticeable as the impact on other areas 
because biotech is generally regarded as less predictable.  Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–376 (2006). 
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
13. Patent Act §§ 101–103.  Congress enacted the first Patent Act in 1790, and two major 
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Section 101 of the Patent Act lists types of inventions that are patentable 
(i.e., are patentable subject matter), including any ―process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any . . . improvement thereof.‖14  
The Court has interpreted this requirement to exclude ―[t]he laws of nature, 
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas.‖15  Nevertheless, the scope of 
patentable subject matter is quite broad, encompassing ―anything under the 
sun that is made by man.‖16 
Section 101 also requires that a patentable invention be new.
17
  This 
requirement is further defined in section 102, stipulating that a new invention 
is not anticipated by prior art, i.e., someone has not already made the same 
invention,
18
 and section 103, stipulating that a new invention as a whole 
should not have been obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art at the 
time of the invention.
19
  Section 103 thus contains a nonobviousness 
requirement. 
Section 103‘s nonobviousness requirement makes instinctive sense: a 
subject matter that would have been obvious is not inventive enough to justify 
a grant of a monopoly.  However, courts have struggled with how to draw the 
line between what is obvious and what is not because, in hindsight, inventions 
may seem more obvious than they were at the time when the invention took 
place.  Not until more than a decade after the adoption of section 103 did the 
Court lay out the general test for nonobviousness.  In the seminal case 
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, the Court developed the Graham 
 
revisions took place in 1870 and 1952.  JANICE M. MUELLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO PATENT LAW 
30, 30–31 (2d ed. 2006).  The current Patent Act is very similar to the 1952 version, which has been 
codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103.  Id. 
14. The full text of section 101 of the Patent Act reads: ―101.  Inventions patentable.  Whoever 
invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent thereof, subject to the conditions and 
requirements of this title.‖  Id. 
15. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (citing Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 
(1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). 
16. Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
17. Patent Act § 101. 
18. Id. § 102. 
19. Patent Act § 103(a) was codified in the 1952 Patent Act.  This section provides that: 
 
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not 
identically disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this 
title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be 
patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole 
would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter 
pertains.  Patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which 
the invention was made. 
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factors.
20
  Four decades later, the Court brought the spotlight back to the 
nonobviousness inquiry in KSR.
21
 
In addition to the novelty requirement, an invention also must be useful to 
be deemed patentable.
22
  A patentable invention needs to have a  
well-established utility; a well-established utility means a utility that ―a person 
of ordinary skill in the art would immediately appreciate . . . and . . . [one that] 
is specific, substantial, and credible.‖23  The utility requirement is not hard to 
satisfy; as long as an inventor can assert a ―particular practical purpose‖ and 
the invention serves this purpose, the requirement is satisfied.
24
  To illustrate 
its utility requirement, the USPTO notes that using ―a complex invention as 
landfill‖ is not a substantial and specific utility.25 
The USPTO currently grants patents on a gene as a new composition of 
matter.
26
  A naturally occurring gene is new and patentable if it is isolated 
from its natural state, i.e., as a purified DNA molecule.
27
  Opponents of gene 
patents often contend that genes are not patentable subject matter because 
genes are the secret of life and because naturally occurring genes, i.e., genes 
that have not been modified by man, are not new.
28
  These arguments have not 
been successful.  Although this Note concedes that natural genes can be new 
compositions of matter under section 101, it proposes that they generally are 
not patentable because they fail the nonobviousness requirement under section 
103. 
III.  GENE PATENTING UNDER ATTACK 
Genes are chemical compositions that carry the information of life.
29
  
Before diving into the controversy surrounding gene patenting, it is helpful to 
first review some basic biochemistry.  And, because this Note proposes to 
incorporate the degree of technical difficulties in obtaining a gene sequence 
into the nonobviousness test, some background information relating to the 
current state of molecular biotechnology is also included. 
 
Id. § 103(a). 
20. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).  Part IV of this Note will further discuss the Graham factors. 
21. KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).   
22. Patent Act § 101. 
23. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. See, e.g., id. at 1093. 
27. See infra Part III.A for the biochemistry of a gene and detailed rationales upon which genes 
are patented. 
28. See infra Part III.C. 
29. Laurie L. Hill, The Race to Patent the Genome: Free Riders, Hold Ups, and the Future of 
Medical Breakthroughs, 11 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 221, 223–24 (2003). 
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A.  Basic Biochemistry: Genes and DNA 
A gene is a piece of Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) that carries the 
information for a genetic trait.
30
  DNA is a linear polymer consisting of four 
types of nucleotides, A, T, G, and C, and the sequence of these nucleotides 
records the genetic information of a cell.
31
  Because of the specific matching 
relationship between these nucleotides, A to T and G to C, a DNA molecule 
strand can be used as a template to synthesize a complementary DNA strand.
32
  
This near-perfect self-replication of DNA molecules ensures that genetic 
information passes on.
33
 
The self-replicating DNA molecules in a cell are used as templates in the 
synthesis of various protein molecules, i.e., a gene is expressed.
34
  A gene 
consists of coding sequences in which every three consecutive nucleotides 
form a strain of codons.
35
  Different codons, i.e., different combinations of  
tri-nucleotides, dictate specific amino acids, which are the building blocks of 
a protein molecule.
36
  A gene also consists of non-coding sequences, in which 
elements regulating the expression profile of the gene often reside.
37
 
Living organisms are the result of proper gene expression, and the 
maintenance and evolution of species depend on the replication of DNA.
38
  
The importance of promoting gene research is obvious.  Scientists can easily 
simulate DNA replication in a test tube, i.e., in vitro,
39
 as long as they know 
parts of the sequence.
40
  Due to the correspondence between codons and 
amino acids, when the sequence of a gene is known, scientists can predict the 
sequence of the protein that the gene encodes.
41
  However, due to codon 
redundancy, scientists cannot determine the exact sequence of a DNA 
 
30. BURTON E. TROPP, MOLECULAR BIOLOGY: GENES TO PROTEINS 12 (3d ed. 2008). 
31. Id. at 6.  This textbook is a good source for basic background knowledge on biology and 
rudimentary molecular genetics. 
32. Id. at 21–22.  DNA molecules exist in cells as matching double strands.  Id.  Although both 
strands get replicated to make identical double-stranded molecules, only one strand stores genetic 
information and participates in transcription.  Id. 
33. Id. at 23. 
34. Id. Different proteins are expressed at different times and in different locations, which 
results in the complicated machinery we call life.  Id. 
35. Id. at 23. 
36. See, e.g., a genetic codon table.  Id. at 907. 
37. For example, a small nucleotides motif, the TATA box, is not transcribed but is required for 
the basal expression of the gene downstream of this motif in eukaryotic cells.  Id. at 671–72. 
38. See id. at 23. 
39. Latin for ―within the glass,‖ referring to an experiment in a test tube. 
40. TROPP, supra note 30, at 162–63.  To simulate DNA replication, scientists need to 
synthesize a short stretch of nucleotides that matches to a strand of DNA as a primer.  Id.  The 
sequence following this stretch can then be synthesized by adding matching nucleotides after the 
primer.  Id. 
41. See, e.g., id. for a genetic codon table. 
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molecule based on the sequence of the protein.
42
 
Researchers do not stop at understanding and simulating the natural 
behavior of a DNA molecule; instead, scientists can manipulate the 
expression of genes in a variety of ways.  Scientists may replace the 
regulatory sequence of a gene to express the gene at a time or at a location 
deviated from its endogenous temporal and spatial profile.
43
  Alternatively, 
scientists may modify the coding sequence of a gene to change the gene‘s 
protein product and its function in a cell.
44
  Some modifications are routine.  
For example, the coding sequence of gene X can be fused with the regulatory 
sequence of gene Y, and the gene chimera will express protein X where 
protein Y naturally exists.  If gene X and gene Y are from different species, 
this modification will enable the expression of a foreign gene in species Y. 
Furthermore, scientists often predict the function of a newly discovered 
DNA sequence based on its homology to other DNA sequences for which 
functions are known.
45
  Homology in molecular evolution theory means a 
shared ancestry, and related species share genes that are highly similar in their 
sequences.
46
  In research, if an unknown DNA molecule consists of sequence 
motifs that are similar to some genes with known functions, then the DNA 
molecule is presumed to share homology with, and perform functions similar 
to that of, these known genes.  Nowadays, with the fast-growing sequence 
databases, newly discovered sequences often can be assigned to putative 
functions after a free, quick Internet search.
47
 
B.  Justification and Rationales to Patent Genes 
1.  Modified Genes Are Patentable as a Composition of Matter Under 
Chakrabarty 
In 1980, the United States Supreme Court‘s decision in Diamond v. 
 
42. A given amino acid can be the product of several different codons (termed ―codon 
redundancy‖).  For example, six different codons all can encode the amino acid Arginine.  Id. 
43. For a gruesome example, see the fruit fly that has legs growing out of its eyes due to the 
expression of genes at the wrong spot.  NEIL A. CAMPBELL ET AL., BIOLOGY 371 (8th ed. 2008). 
44. See, e.g., id. at 344. 
45. Many bioinformatics tools are available to predict gene functions based on sequence 
homology.  See, e.g., id. at 430. 
46. Id. at 463. 
47. For example, one can input a DNA sequence into the Basic Local Assignment Search Tool 
(BLAST) search engine provided by the National Center for Biotechnology Information (NCBI), 
and, within seconds, a map of matched domains will appear.  By following the linked description of 
these domains, a biologist can often predict the function of the input sequence.  The BLAST search 
engine is equipped with 800 complete genomes from thirty-three species, representing mammals, 
other vertebrates, invertebrates, plants, fungi, and protozoa.  BLAST, 
http://blast.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/Blast.cgi (last visited Dec. 2, 2009). 
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Chakrabarty allowed the patenting of a living organism.
48
  The Court noted 
that the patentable subject matter under section 101 of the Patent Act should 
be broadly construed, and that a living organism could be viewed as a 
―manufacture, or [a] composition of matter,‖ both being patentable subject 
matter.
49
  The Court stated that ―Congress intended statutory subject matter to 
‗include anything under the sun that is made by man.‘‖50  Therefore, the Court 
concluded that a genetically modified organism is patentable subject matter 
because it is ―a product of human ingenuity,‖ not a ―hitherto unknown natural 
phenomenon.‖51  The Court in Chakrabarty found the patentability of a living 
organism depended on whether the living thing was modified by a human, and 
thus refused to take an ethical stand on the issue.
52
  Under this line of logic, 
although genes are regarded as sacred by many, they are patentable subject 
matter under section 101 as long as the genes sought to be patented are 
modified by a researcher. 
2.  Purified and Isolated DNA Sequences Are Patentable Even If They Exist 
in Nature 
Chakrabarty does not justify the patenting of a naturally occurring gene.  
The current rationale for patenting a gene with its sequence unmodified is 
instead based on the 1970 In re Bergstrom decision, in which the court held 
that a purified form of a compound was patentable even though its impure 
form was known to the public.
53
  In this case, the court conceded that ―an 
unknown compound or composition of materials merely discovered from 
nature is not patentable.‖54  However, the court further noted that, because the 
pure form of the compound did not exist in nature, the pure form of the 
natural compound was patentable subject matter.
55
  The court also pointed out 
that whether the pure form of the compound possessed the same function as 
the impure mixture was irrelevant to the inquiry into patentability.
56
 
 
48. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980). 
49. Id. at 308. 
50. Id. at 309 (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 6 (1952)). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. at 316–18.  The Court in Chakrabarty split five to four.  Id. at 303.  Chief Justice Burger 
delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens 
joined.  Id.  Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion, in which Justices White, Marshall, and Powell 
joined.  Id. 
53. In re Bergstrom, 427 F.2d 1394, 1401–02 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
54. Id. at 1401. 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 1402. 
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3.  Computer-Predicted Utility Based on Homology to Known Proteins Is a 
Utility that Satisfies Section 101 
Following Bergstrom, inventors may apply for gene patents for which 
they have not developed a practical function; scientists can merely assert a 
gene‘s natural function in a cell as its utility in a gene patent.57  In practice, a 
gene patent application satisfies the utility requirement if the sequence of the 
gene is homologous to another gene whose function has been characterized.
58
  
Homology is often presumed from sequence similarities between the current 
invention and the prior art genes.
59
  However, this sequence similarity creates 
a prima facie case of obviousness.
60
 
4.  The Federal Circuit
61
 Held in 1995 that a DNA of Which the Protein 
Product Is Homologous to a Known Protein Is Not Obvious 
A prima facie case of nonobviousness based on sequence similarities is 
not difficult to rebut.
62
  For example, in In re Deuel, Thomas F. Deuel and his 
collaborators (collectively Deuel) tried to patent some sequences encoding the 
protein HBGF at a time when the sequence of neither the protein HBGF nor 
the gene encoding HBGF was known.
63
  Deuel followed an established 
protocol based on the Maniatis reference to obtain the DNA sequence that 
encodes HBGF.
64
  However, an article by Bohlen had previously disclosed a 
protein, HBBM, that shares a sequence similarity with an HBGF protein.
65
  
The USPTO rejected the patent for being obvious under the combination of 
the Bohlen reference and the Maniatis reference.
66
 
The Federal Circuit reversed.
67
  First, the court held that the Bohlen 
reference did not disclose the structure of a DNA molecule but that of a 
 
57. See id. 
58. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1092–99 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
59. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
60. Id. 
61. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the Federal Circuit) is the 
special venue that deals with patent cases.  It was formed in 1982 by the merger of the United States 
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the appellate division of the United States Court of Claims.  
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/about.html (last 
visited Dec. 2, 2009).  
62. Many DNA sequences that are homologous to known genes have been patented.  The 
claims underlying the Deuel case are examples. 
63. Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1554–55. 
64. Id. at 1555.  ―Maniatis describes a method of isolating DNAs or cDNAs by screening a 
DNA or cDNA library with a gene probe.‖  Id. at 1556. 
65. Id.  Peter Bohlen was named as inventor of European Patent Application No. 0326075, 
published August 2, 1989.  Id. at 1556 n.3. 
66. Id. at 1555–56. 
67. The court reversed the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences‘ decision.  Id. at 1559. 
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protein molecule.
68
  Due to codon redundancy, the DNA sequence encoding 
HBGF was not obvious upon the release of the protein sequence of HBBM.
69
  
The court also criticized the USPTO‘s reliance on the Maniatis reference 
because the claim was directed at a composition, not a method.
70
  The court 
reasoned that ―the existence of a general method of isolating . . . DNA 
molecules is essentially irrelevant to the question whether the specific 
molecules themselves would have been obvious, in the absence of other prior 
art that suggests the claimed DNAs.‖71 
Under the USPTO‘s generous examination standards, many genes are 
patented.  Between 1970 and 1979, only 123 DNA-based patents were 
granted.
72
  The number increased to 16,057 between 1990 and 1999.
73
  Since 
2000, about 3,000 to 4,000 DNA-based patents have been granted each year.
74
  
Despite the growing number of gene patents, the opposition to gene patenting 
remains strong.
75
 
C.  Ethical and Practical Concerns About Patenting Genes and Unsuccessful 
Attempts to Abolish or Limit Gene Patents 
1.  Ethical Concerns and a Recent Legislative Effort in Eliminating Gene 
Patents 
Opponents of gene patents claim that genes should not be patentable 
subject matter because ―the sequence of the human genome is at the core of 
what it means to be human and no person should be able to own/control 
something so basic.‖76  However, the USPTO and the federal courts adhere to 
the statutory requirements of patentability and refuse to take an ethical stand 
on the issue.
77
  Because of this reluctance in the executive and judicial 
branches, these opponents continue to lobby for a complete legislative ban on 
gene patents. 
For example, the Genomic Research and Accessibility Act (GRAA) was 
proposed in the 110th Congress to completely stop granting patents on the 
 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. 
71. Id.  The court‘s statement in the Deuel decision essentially has been overruled after KSR.  
See infra Part IV.D.3. 
72. DPD: About the DNA Patent Database, http://dnapatents.georgetown.edu/aboutdpd.htm 
(last visited Dec. 2, 2009).  ―The DPD is a core of Duke University‘s Center for Excellence in ELSI 
Research . . . .‖  Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Hill, supra note 29, at 222–23, 241–45. 
76. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
77. See id. at 1093–94. 
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human genome and all nucleotide sequences.
78
  The scope of this bill 
encompasses naturally occurring genes as well as synthetic DNA or RNA 
molecules.  But the GRAA received very little support.  After its introduction 
and referral to subcommittees in early 2007, no movement has been reported, 
and the Act seems to have been abandoned.
79
  Some even found the GRAA 
―extreme and unprecedented‖ and noted that ―Congress and the courts  
have . . . refused to enact any subject matter specific limitation on patentable 
subject matter,‖80 including a ban on controversial issues such as human 
cloning. 
A subject-matter-specific limitation is not likely to succeed in the future 
either.  The only subject-matter limitation that is based on ethical concerns is 
a USPTO policy to refuse claims encompassing a human being; a policy that 
does not receive explicit support from either the legislative branch or the 
judicial branch.
81
  There is no indication that the USPTO has considered a 
similar policy to ban gene patents.
82
 
2.  Gene Patents Should Not Be Allowed Because They Impede, Rather than 
Advance, Research and Development 
Another group of opponents to gene patents contends that the justification 
for the patent system fails for gene patents.
83
  The patent system grants a  
time-limited monopoly to an inventor to induce him to disclose his invention 
to the public.  The theory behind this limited monopoly is that the inventor 
will have an incentive to invest time and resources into developing the 
invention.  Furthermore, the public will receive the benefit of having access to 
the information regarding the invention.  However, opponents of gene 
patenting assert that a twenty-year term monopoly on genes cannot be 
justified on either the grounds that the monopoly promotes investment or that 
it benefits the public.
84
 
First, gene patents provide patent owners with more power than that 
 
78. H.R. 977, 110th Cong. (2007).  ―Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no patent may 
be obtained for a nucleotide sequence, or its functions or correlations, or the naturally occurring 
products it specifies.‖  Id.   
 79. GovTrack.us, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-977 (last visited on  
Dec. 2, 2009).  Issues regarding the patentability of biological molecules are not mentioned in the 
latest efforts to reform the Patent Act.  S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009). 
80. Christopher M. Holman, The Impact of Human Gene Patents on Innovation and Access: A 
Survey of Human Gene Patent Litigation, 76 UMKC L. REV. 295, 296 (2007). 
81. U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2105 
(2007). 
82. This Note proposes that, in light of the KSR decision, the USPTO should adopt a more 
stringent system for granting patents on genes. 
83. Hill, supra note 29, at 241. 
84. See id. 
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bestowed by other types of patents because gene patents are impossible to 
design around.
85
  When a mechanical device is patented, a person skilled in 
mechanical engineering may examine the patent and design a device that is 
different from the one claimed in the patent but achieves a similar purpose.
86
  
Design-around products are generally encouraged.
87
  However, once a gene is 
patented, all research related to this piece of DNA sequence is suspended until 
the expiration of the patent.  Furthermore, gene patents are often built on 
knowledge accumulated by publicly funded basic research.
88
  Therefore, an 
imbalance exists between the input and the output of a gene patent owner. 
Second, gene researchers generally are not affected by the incentives 
provided by the patent system.
89
  The driving force behind basic scientific 
research comes from university scientists, who receive mostly public funding 
for their research and who are often perceived to be motivated by peer 
recognition rather than economic reward.
90
 
However, gene patents are not likely to be limited under this theory 
because, although Congress enacted the Patent Act to promote progress in 
science,
91
 this purpose is not a statutory requirement of patentability.  Also, 
patent owners rarely file infringement actions against a noncommercial 
researcher;
92
 therefore, whether gene patents will impede basic research is not 
clear.
93
 
In summary, arguments against gene patenting generally assert that genes 
should be treated differently from other subject matter and new criteria should 
be adopted for determining the patentability of genes.  While the USPTO has 
issued special guidelines for how a gene patent should be presented, including 
both a written requirement and a disposition requirement, the USPTO found 
no statutory basis for treating the patentability of genes differently than other 
types of patentable subject matter.
94
  Opponents of gene patenting argue either 
that precedent should be overturned or that new legislation should be passed 
 
85. Id. at 257. 
86. See id. at 236. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 242–46. 
89. Id. at 243. 
90. Id. 
91. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
92. See Amy Yancey & C. Neal Steward Jr., Are University Researchers at Risk for Patent 
Infringement?, 25 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 1225, 1225–28 (2007).  Companies producing gene 
chips, such as Affymetrix, incorporate thousands of gene sequences in their products but have never 
been sued by a patent owner.  Id. 
93. Many researchers in noncommercial research facilities are not aware of gene patents.  Very 
often, university researchers obtain a free license to work on a patented gene. 
94. USPTO Utility Examination Guidelines, 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1093 (Jan. 5, 2001). 
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to limit the patentability of genes.
95
  Some even advocate a ban on gene 
patenting altogether.
96
  However, this Note proposes that the Court‘s decision 
in KSR has already provided a basis for limiting the scope of gene patents on 
the ground of nonobviousness. 
IV.  NONOBVIOUSNESS TESTS: GRAHAM, KSR, AND POST-KSR CASES 
A.  The Framework for a Nonobviousness Analysis: The Graham Factors 
Little more than a decade after Congress adopted the statutory 
requirement of nonobviousness, the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere 
Co. of Kansas City laid out a multifactor test to assist in drawing a line 
between what is or is not obvious.
97
  At least one reason why the Court 
examined the nonobviousness issue was ―a notorious difference between the 
standards applied by the Patent Office [and those applied] by the courts.‖98  
The Court analyzed the legislative history of section 103 and found that 
Congress, in enacting section 103, had not intended to lower the bar on 
patentability but merely intended to bring ―uniformity and definiteness‖ to the 
issue of what is ―new.‖99  The Court concluded that this congressional goal 
could be achieved by conducting a case-by-case inquiry into nonobviousness 
pursuant to a practical test of patentability, later referred to as the Graham 
factors.
100
 
The Graham factors provide a step-by-step analysis of nonobviousness 
according to the statutory language in section 103.
101
  The first step of the 
inquiry is to determine ―the scope and content of the prior art [and to ascertain 
the] differences between the prior art and the claims at issue.‖102  The second 
step is to resolve ―the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art‖103 to 
determine whether ―the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at 
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the 
art.‖104  Additionally, the Court noted that factors termed ―secondary 
considerations‖ might be used ―to give light to the circumstances surrounding 
the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented[,]‖ including 
 
95. See supra Part III.C.1. 
96. See id. 
97. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
98. Id. at 18. 
99. Id. at 17.  For the requirement that an invention needs to be new to be patentable, see Patent 
Act § 101. 
100. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
101. See supra note 19 for the precise language of section 103. 
102. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
103. Id. 
104. Patent Act § 103(a). 
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―commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.‖105  
The Court further explained that secondary considerations were included to 
―‗guard against slipping into use of hindsight‘106 . . . and to resist the 
temptation to read into the prior art the teachings of the invention in issue.‖107 
Essentially, the issue in Graham was whether a combination of two 
known elements could be nonobvious and, thus, patentable.
108
  The lower 
courts found that, although the invention was ―a combination of old 
elements,‖ it was nonobvious and patentable because ―nothing in the prior art 
[suggested the] unique combination of these old features‖ and because the 
invention fulfilled ―the long-felt need with an economical, efficient, utilitarian 
apparatus which achieved novel results and immediate commercial 
success.‖109  However, the Supreme Court disagreed and found that the 
invention ―rests upon exceedingly small and quite non-technical mechanical 
differences in a device which was old in the art.‖110  The long-felt need was 
irrelevant in Graham because the reference that rendered the invention 
obvious had not come out until recently.
111
  But the Court did not comment 
specifically on the absence of a suggestion to combine references.
112
 
B.  Four Decades: Federal Courts’ Efforts to Apply the Graham Factors 
Federal courts generally have followed Graham‘s analysis of 
nonobviousness.
113
  Between 1966, when Graham was decided, and 2007, 
when the Court once again picked up the issue of nonobviousness, 978 federal 
cases involved a determination of nonobviousness,
114
 of which at least 688 
adopted the Graham factors in their analyses.
115
  Similarly, of 138 cases in the 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the Federal Circuit) that dealt with 
 
105. Graham, 383 U.S. at 17–18. 
106. Id. at 36 (quoting Monroe Auto Equip. Co. v. Heckethorn Mfg. & Supply Co., 332 F.2d 
406, 412 (1964)). 
107. Id. at 36. 
108. Id. at 30. 
109. Id. at 30 (quoting Calmar, Inc. v. Cook Chem. Co., 336 F.2d 110, 113–14 (8th Cir. 1964)). 
110. Id. at 36. 
111. Id. 
112. Later, the federal courts in applying the Graham factors introduced the requirement of a 
motivation or a suggestion to combine prior art references.  See infra Part IV.B. 
113. The author Shepardized® the Graham case on Lexis and restricted the search to  
Headnote 3 of the Graham case for cases that have adopted the Graham factors.  Before the KSR 
decision, 688 cases utilized the Graham factors. 
114. The author conducted the searches on http://www.lexisnexis.com/lawschool/research.  The 
time period is from February 21, 1966, to April 30, 2007.  The author conducted a search for the term 
―nonobviousness‖ in all the cases from federal courts and retrieved 1,041 cases.  A refined search for 
cases from the eleven circuits (district courts and courts of appeals), the D.C. Circuit, and the Federal 
Circuit yielded 978 cases involving nonobviousness. 
115. See supra note 113. 
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nonobviousness, 96 cases adopted the Graham factors.
116
 
Aside from the Graham factors, courts often ask whether there is a 
suggestion or motivation to combine known elements in prior art 
references.
117
  For example, a Federal Circuit decision in 2005 stated that:  
 
. . . [S]ection 103 requires some suggestion or motivation 
in the prior art to make the new combination . . . [and dictates 
that a] suggestion or motivation to modify prior art teachings 
may appear in the content of the public prior art, in the nature 
of the problem addressed by the invention, or even in the 
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art.
118
 
 
The court resorted to expert testimony to determine whether a motivation or 
suggestion to combine the available prior art references existed for a person 
with ordinary skill in the art.
119
 
In developing this ―teaching, suggestion, or motivation‖ test (the TSM 
test), federal courts did not add additional requirements to nonobviousness.
120
  
Rather, the test is a strategy to evaluate the difference between the prior art 
and the current invention: if something implicitly or explicitly teaches, 
suggests, or motivates the combination of several prior art references, the 
difference between the new combination and prior art is not patentable.
121
  
The courts applied the TSM test because, without evidence of this teaching, 
suggestion, or motivation, a nonobviousness analysis ―simply takes the 
inventor‘s disclosure as a blueprint for piecing together the prior art to defeat 
patentability. . . .‖122 
This test is apparently a flexible one—a suggestion or motivation can be 
found beyond the prior art and even in the general knowledge of a person with 
ordinary skill in the art.  However, the application of this test was deemed too 
rigid when the Supreme Court decided to review the nonobviousness issue 
again.
123
 
 
116. The search strategy was similar to those described in supra notes 113–15. 
117. Princeton Biochemicals, Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. See Princeton Biochemicals, 411 F.3d at 1338. 
121. Id. 
122. Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int‘l Co., 119 Fed. App‘x 282, 285 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
123. KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415–28 (2007). 
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C.  The KSR Decision: The Return of the Graham Factors 
When the Federal Circuit applied the TSM test of nonobviousness, the 
court held that when two prior art references taught two aspects of an 
invention but did not specifically address the problem that the patentee had set 
out to solve, the patentee lacked the motivation to combine the two references 
and the invention was not obvious.
124
  The Supreme Court found that the TSM 
test, at least as applied by the Federal Circuit, was too rigid and conflicted 
with the Court‘s precedents.125 
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that the TSM requirement 
was insightful because ―discoveries almost of necessity will be combinations 
of what, in some sense, is already known,‖126 the Court refused to adopt a 
rigid and mandatory formula in applying the test; the Court stated that 
―neither the particular motivation nor the avowed purpose of the patentee 
controls.‖127  Therefore, if the combination of the references was obvious to a 
person with ordinary skill in the art at the time the invention was made, even 
though the prior art references failed to specifically teach, suggest, or 
motivate the invention, the invention would be obvious and nonpatentable.
128
 
The impact of KSR goes beyond the TSM test.  Indeed, the Court did not 
renounce the TSM test, and this test generally was not rigidly applied in the 
federal courts.
129
  However, because KSR was the second case on 
nonobviousness in four decades, the Court reviewed a series of rationales in 
finding an invention obvious and brought nonobviousness back to the center 
stage of a challenge against patent validity.
130
  One of the rationales in finding 
obviousness, the obvious to try standard, provides the basis for the proposed 
framework in limiting the validity and the scope of gene patents.
131
 
D.  Post-KSR: The Revived Obvious to Try Standard 
Courts have rejected the obvious to try argument in many cases because 
―selective hindsight is no more applicable to the design of experiments than it 
is to the combination of prior art teachings.‖132  Courts instead adopted an 
 
124. Teleflex, 119 Fed. App‘x at 286. 
125. KSR, 550 U.S. at 419.  
126. Id. at 418–19. 
127. Id. at 419. 
128. Id. at 419–21. 
129. See, e.g., Princeton Biochemicals Inc. v. Beckman Coulter, Inc., 411 F.3d 1332 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
130. KSR, 550 U.S. at 419–20. 
131. See infra Part V. 
132. In re Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d 469, 473 (Fed. Cir. 1988).  Until recently, the Federal 
Circuit clearly denied the obvious to try argument.  See, e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Andrx Pharms., Inc., 
452 F.3d 1331, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
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inquiry that was similar to the TSM test and examined whether there was ―a 
reason or suggestion in the art for selecting the procedure used, other than the 
knowledge learned from the applicant‘s disclosure.‖133 
The KSR Court, however, held that ―the fact that a combination was 
obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103‖ in some 
instances.
134
  Whether an invention is obvious under the obvious to try 
standard depends on (1) whether ―there are a finite number of identified, 
predictable solutions‖ for the problem that the invention seeks to resolve, and, 
thus, ―a person of ordinary skill in the art has good reason to pursue the 
known options within his or her technical grasp‖; and (2) whether the effort 
―leads to the anticipated success.‖135  If the answer is affirmative to both 
inquiries, the invention ―is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary 
skill and common sense‖ and is not patentable.136 
Courts immediately adopted this revived obvious to try standard in 
nonobviousness inquiries.  The following three cases illustrate how courts 
find nonobviousness in biotech patents using the revived obvious to try 
standard. 
1.  PharmaStem: An Invention May Be Obvious If It Merely Proves 
Something Suggested by Prior Art 
Only two months after the KSR decision, the Federal Circuit in 
PharmaStem found claims obvious where the scientists did not create 
anything new but merely proved by experimentation that something suggested 
in the literature was true.
137
  The court further noted that ―obviousness ‗does 
not require absolute predictability of success.‘‖138 
On the other hand, the court noted that the amount of effort that the 
inventor needs to put in to succeed might decide whether the invention is 
obvious.
139
  For example, the invention is not obvious if the inventor has ―‗to 
vary all parameters or try each of numerous possible choices until one 
possibly arrived at a successful result, where the prior art gave either no 
indication of which parameters were critical or no direction as to which of 
many possible choices is likely to be successful.‘‖140  Similarly, the invention 
is not obvious if ―the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular 
 
133. Dow Chem. Co., 837 F.2d at 473. 
134. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421. 
135. Id. at 402. 
136. Id. at 402–03. 
137. PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
138. Id. at 1364 (quoting In re O‘Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988)). 
139. Id. 
140. Id. (quoting In re O’Farrell, 853 F.2d at 903). 
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form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it,‖ and the inventor must 
―explore a new technology or general approach that seemed to be a promising 
field of experimentation.‖141 
2.  Board of Trustees v. Roche: An Invention May Be Obvious Even Though 
It Does Not Seem to Be Obvious to Try in General 
In 2008, a district court utilized the obvious to try standard to invalidate a 
claim involving a biotech patent.
142
  The invention claimed a method of 
evaluating the effectiveness of anti-HIV therapy through quantifying the 
amount of HIV RNA by PCR.
143
  The relevant prior art references included 
(1) an article by Holodniy disclosing a method of quantifying the amount of 
HIV RNA molecules by PCR and suggesting the potential of using HIV RNA 
as a marker for the amount of HIV virus;
144
 and (2) an article by Ho 
presenting a correlation between the therapeutic effectiveness of a drug and 
the amount of HIV virus through viral culture.
145
 
The court conceded that ―although the use of HIV RNA as a surrogate 
marker was arguably not obvious to try with any reasonable expectation of 
success, the claims-at-issue may still be obvious‖ because the focus of a 
court‘s nonobviousness inquiry is ―to determine the validity of each individual 
claim, in light of the prior art.‖146  The major difference between the claims 
and Holodniy‘s article was ―the evaluation and correlation steps of the 
claims,‖ which was obvious in light of Ho‘s article.147 
 
141. Id. 
142. Bd. of Trs. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
143. Id. at 1021.  PCR is a bio-technique in which the presence of a certain DNA molecule is 
amplified in a test tube through mimicking DNA replication.  See Kamrin T. MacKnight, Polymerase 
Chain Reaction (PCR): The Second Generation of DNA Analysis Methods Takes the Stand, 20 
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 95, 108–16 (2003).  PCR can be used to relatively 
quantify the amount of a certain DNA molecule in a bio-sample.  Id. 
144. Roche, 563 F. Supp. 2d at 1023 n.2.  The method involves two primary steps: in the first 
step, the HIV RNA molecules are reverse-transcribed into DNA molecules; and, in the second step, 
these DNA molecules are magnified by PCR.  Id. at 1024; see also Mark Holodniy et al., Detection 
and Quantification of Human Immunodeficiency Virus RNA in Patient Serum by Use of the 
Polymerase Chain Reaction, 163 J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 862, 864–65 (1991). 
145. Roche, 563 F. Supp. at 1027 n.10; see also David D. Ho et al., Quantitation of Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Type 1 in the Blood of Infected Persons, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1621, 
1621–25 (1989). 
146. Roche, 563 F. Supp. at 1044.  When this invention was made, several molecules had 
potential to be used as markers, including the HIV RNA, but the RNA was not particularly 
promising.  Id. at 1027. 
147. Id. at 1044. 
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3.  In re Kubin: A DNA Patent Is Found Obvious Under the Obvious to Try 
Standard 
In 2009, the Federal Circuit applied the revived obvious to try standard 
and found unpatentably obvious ―a claim to a classic biotechnology 
invention—the isolation and sequencing of a human gene that encodes a 
particular domain of a protein.‖148  The appellant, Kubin, sought to patent 
some cDNA
149
 sequences, and the prior art disclosed the method to obtain 
homologous cDNA sequences from a different species.
150
  The Federal Circuit 
held that ―the claimed invention was reasonably expected in light of the prior 
art and ‗obvious to try‘‖ because ―artisans in [the] field . . . had every 
motivation to seek and every reasonable expectation of success in achieving 
the sequence of the claimed invention.‖151  To reach this holding, the Kubin 
court specifically addressed the earlier Deuel decision
152
 and stated that ―the 
Supreme Court in KSR unambiguously discredited [Deuel].‖153 
The Kubin court outlined two classes of situations in which an obvious to 
try combination of prior art references may not render the invention obvious 
under section 103.
154
  First, an obvious to try combination may not be obvious 
when the inventor ―merely throws metaphorical darts at a board filled with 
combinatorial prior art possibilities . . . .‖155  The Kubin court contrasted this 
situation to the nonobviousness finding described in KSR ―where a skilled 
artisan merely pursues ‗known options‘ from a ‗finite number of identified, 
predictable solutions.‘‖156  Second, an obvious to try combination may not be 
obvious ―‗where the prior art gave only general guidance as to the particular 
form of the claimed invention or how to achieve it[, rather than providing a] 
detailed enabling methodology for practicing the claimed invention‘ . . . .‖157 
 
148. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
149. cDNA is the shorthand for complementary DNA.  TROPP, supra note 30, at 168.  It is a 
synthetic strand of DNA that complements an RNA strand.  Id.  Because of the instability of an RNA 
molecule, cDNA is often used in studying RNA.  Id.  cDNA is different from genomic DNA in that it 
does not contain introns, the non-coding sequences between coding sequences in a gene.  Id. at  
760–61.  During transcription, when an RNA molecule is made using a piece of genomic DNA as a 
template, introns are incised and, thus, the mature RNA molecule contains sequences complementary 
only to coding sequences.  Id. 
150. Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1352–53. 
151. Id. at 1361. 
152. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (discrediting the obvious to try standard 
and holding that a DNA molecule with known homologs is not obvious, even though it would have 
been obvious to try to isolate this gene based on its known homologs); supra Part III.B. 
153. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
154. Id. at 1359. 
155. Id. 
156. Id. (quoting KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007)). 
157. Id. at 1359–60 (quoting In re O‘Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 902–03 (Fed. Cir. 1988)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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Further, the Kubin court discredited the idea that the KSR decision will 
have less impact on the biotech field due to the field‘s unpredictable nature.158  
The court pointed out that, although KSR involved predictable arts, as 
opposed to the unpredictable art of biotechnology, the current invention was 
obvious due to ―the well-known and reliable nature of the cloning and 
sequencing techniques in the prior art . . . [and] the readily knowable and 
obtainable structure of an identified protein.‖159 
Therefore, pursuant to the obvious to try standard of nonobviousness that 
was revived by the KSR Court and the interpretation of this standard by lower 
courts, the USPTO should accordingly modify its guidelines for granting 
patents to genetic material.  In Part V, this Note proposes a system whereby 
genes are patentable only under certain conditions when a gene sequence 
survives the obvious to try standard, such as when the claim sequence has no 
counterpart with known functions or when the claimed function of this 
sequence deviates from what is expected based on the sequence homology. 
V.  PROPOSED LIMITATIONS ON VALIDITY AND SCOPE OF GENE PATENTS  
The revived obvious to try standard and its interpretation by federal courts 
calls for a reconsideration of the validity and scope of gene patents.  This 
Note suggests a set of criteria for the patentability of genes that incorporates 
this revived obvious to try standard into a nonobviousness inquiry.  This set of 
criteria at least partially addresses the major concerns about gene patenting. 
A.  The Impact of Post-KSR Obvious to Try Cases on the  
Validity and Scope of Gene Patents 
1.  PharmaStem Limits Patents on Naturally Occurring Genes to Those with 
New or Unexpected Functions Only 
Under PharmaStem, a gene with a previously identified homolog may be 
unpatentable due to a lack of nonobviousness because the previously 
identified homolog often suggests the existence of this gene with a similar 
sequence and similar functions.
160
 
For example, many plant species have genes belonging to the so-called 
APETALA1 (AP1) family.
161
  Genes from this family share similar sequences, 
 
158. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2009); cf. Aquino, supra note 9, at 429. 
159. Kubin, 561 F.3d at 1360. 
160. See PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 
2007). 
161. For a review of the evolution of genes in this family, see, e.g., Amy Litt & Vivian F. Irish, 
Duplication and Diversification in the APETALA1/FRUITFULL Floral Homeotic Gene Lineage: 
Implications for the Evolution of Floral Development, 165 GENETICS 821, 821–33 (2003). 
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especially in the portions that are important to their functions.
162
  The function 
of these genes, in their respective species, is to make the outer layers of a 
flower—the sepals and the petals.163  Manipulations of the expression level of 
these genes generally will produce plants with a different floral morphology
164
 
and flowering time.
165
 
If there is market pressure to study the reproductive development of a 
dicot plant, a researcher may be interested in isolating the AP1 gene of this 
plant because that gene is likely to play an important role in the floral 
development of this plant, as has been suggested by previous literature 
relating to AP1 genes from other species.
166
  There are several standard 
protocols that the researcher may use to isolate AP1 genes.
167
  The success is 
not guaranteed, and the researcher may have to adjust the conditions and 
parameters in the protocols.  Nevertheless, in many situations, this discovery 
process is routine laboratory work. 
The discovery of another gene from the AP1 family in a different species 
is similar to the situation in PharmaStem, in which the scientists simply 
proved by experimentation that something suggested in the literature was true 
but nothing new was created.
168
  This gene is not patentable under the obvious 
to try standard in KSR
169
 unless at least one of two situations occurs. 
First, if the newly found member of the family exhibits a new and 
unexpected function, for example, if the AP1 gene of this plant displays a 
function unrelated to other AP1 genes, its discovery may be nonobvious 
because the effort does not ―lead[] to the anticipated success.‖170  Second, if 
the plant is so unique that the previously established standard protocols cannot 
produce the desired result and, instead, the researcher has to devote extensive 
effort to prove the existence and to obtain the sequence of this gene, its 
discovery may be nonobvious because the inventor‘s expenditure of effort is 
relevant in a nonobviousness inquiry. 
 
162. Id. 
163. John L. Bowman et al., Control of Flower Development in Arabidopsis Thaliana by 
APETALA1 and Interacting Genes, 119 DEVELOPMENT 721, 721–43 (1993). 
164. Id. 
165. M. Alejandra Mandel & Martin F. Yanofsky, A
 
Gene Triggering Flower Formation in 
Arabidopsis, 377 NATURE 522, 522–24 (1995). 
166. Id. at 524. 
167. E.g., JOSEPH SAMBROOK ET AL., MOLECULAR CLONING: A LABORATORY MANUAL  
(2d ed. 1989). 
168. PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
169. See KSR Int‘l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419–21 (2007). 
170. Id. at 421. 
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2.  Board of Trustees v. Roche Limits Patents on Modified Genes to Those 
with Novel Modifications 
The court in Board of Trustees v. Roche
171
 noted that an obviousness 
determination is not made in the abstract but is made in light of prior art 
references.  A modified gene may not be obvious when viewed in the abstract 
for it does not exist in any natural being.
172
  However, in light of prior art 
references relating to the natural sequence of this gene and those relating to 
the method of modification, the modified gene may be obvious. 
For example, a scientist may want to express gene X from species-x in 
species-y.  However, literature-1 teaches that gene A from species-a does not 
express very well in species-b, unless a certain DNA piece, B, from species-b 
is incorporated into gene A.  Literature-2 discloses that species-b is closely 
related to species-y, while a is closely related to x.  The scientist thus 
incorporates a piece of DNA from species-y, Y, into gene X and synthesizes a 
new gene X-Y to express in y.  The gene X-Y may not be obvious in the 
abstract because it did not exist previously, and to add Y onto X may not be 
obvious if there are several other possible ways to modify gene X for its 
expression in species-y.  Nevertheless, the gene X-Y may be obvious because 
the only difference between the current invention and literature-1 is the 
applicability of the method in literature-1 in a different species, and  
literature-2 makes it obvious to try this modification in a related species and 
there is a reasonable expectation of success. 
Therefore, only genes modified in a way that is novel to a person with 
ordinary skills in the art should be patentable under Board of Trustees v. 
Roche. 
3.  In re Kubin Demonstrates the Potential for Limiting Gene Patentability 
Under KSR 
The Kubin decision makes the technical difficulty relevant in a 
nonobviousness inquiry,
173
 which should significantly limit gene patents 
because today a skilled artisan essentially can create any DNA molecule.  
Therefore, under Kubin, naturally occurring genes with known homologs may 
not be patentable because the techniques involved in obtaining these genes are 
routine experiments; further, DNA sequences resulting from modifications of 
natural genes may not be patentable if the method of modification is routine. 
 
171. Bd. of Trs. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 F. Supp. 2d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
172. Id. 
173. In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  See supra Part IV.D. 
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B.  A Set of Criteria for Gene Patentability that Complies with the  
Revived Obvious to Try Standard 
Based on the obvious to try standard revived in KSR and its subsequent 
interpretation by lower courts, this Note proposes a system in which, 
generally, genes are not patentable.  This system deals differently with genes 
that naturally exist in cells and those that are products of human 
modifications, and it takes into consideration how much effort an inventor 
needs to invest to obtain the gene. 
For a naturally occurring DNA molecule, if its function as described in the 
patent application is one that agrees with the prediction based on its sequence 
homology to a protein with a known function, it is not patentable on the 
ground of nonobviousness, without regard to the fact that the inventor is the 
first to purify and isolate this DNA molecule. 
On the other hand, if a naturally occurring DNA molecule does not have 
any identifiable functional domain, or its function as described in the patent 
application is distinct from the prediction based on its sequence homology to a 
protein with a known function, it may be nonobvious and thus patentable. 
Also, if a naturally occurring DNA molecule is of a species that makes 
molecular discoveries quite difficult due to the unique characteristics of the 
species or the mere fact that few studies have been performed on the species, 
it may be nonobvious and thus patentable. 
For a modified DNA molecule, if the modification is based on a technique 
that is obvious to a person with ordinary skill in the art and the modification 
leads to an expected change in the function or expression of the gene, it is not 
patentable.  On the other hand, if the modification itself is novel or the 
modified DNA displays a characteristic that is not predictable, given the 
current state of the art, it may be nonobvious and thus patentable. 
C.  This Set of Criteria for Gene Patentability Addresses Major Concerns 
About Gene Patenting 
These proposed gene patentability criteria generally deny patent 
protection for naturally occurring genes, which addresses at least part of the 
ethical concerns about gene patenting.  The human genome has been fully 
sequenced, and many human genes have been functionally characterized or 
assigned putative functions based on sequence homology to known 
proteins.
174
  Strategies for studying human genes are well developed.
175
  
Therefore, the threshold for a human gene to obtain patent protection under 
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this system is quite high and unusual.  Only when an inventor establishes that 
a human gene functions in a way that is distinct from the prediction based on 
sequence homology may this gene be patentable. 
These proposed gene patentability criteria balance the interests in 
encouraging gene discovery and in promoting follow-up research, and they 
agree with the congressional authority of enacting the Patent Act—to promote 
the progress of the sciences.  Under this system, gene discovery resulting from 
routine laboratory work will not qualify for patent protection.  Exclusive 
rights in a gene, in this instance, will hinder the follow-up research on a 
gene‘s function and its potential benefits to society because such monopoly 
will restrain the right to study this gene to only the owner of the patent for a 
term of twenty years.  At the same time, the disclosure of the gene‘s sequence 
without a function or utility to the public does not provide any clear societal 
benefit.  However, genes that are technically difficult to discover may qualify 
for patent protection.  In this scenario, the exclusive rights are the incentive 
for the inventor to invest in the discovery and the public disclosure of these 
new genes will benefit scientists who face similar technical difficulties.  These 
benefits outweigh the limitation that only inventors may further develop the 
function of the genes.  Furthermore, a naturally occurring gene with a novel 
function, or a gene modified in a novel way, may qualify for patent protection 
under this system.  The public disclosure of a gene with unexpected functions 
opens possibilities for future research on other genes, while a new way to 
modify a gene for a novel utility benefits the public because it opens new 
possibilities in gene research. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Gene patenting has always provoked controversy.  Opponents of gene 
patenting seek either to pass a statutory ban on gene patenting on ethical 
grounds or to limit the scope of gene patents by adding new criteria to 
patentability.  However, these efforts have not proven successful.  This Note, 
instead, argues that the KSR decision by the Supreme Court already limits the 
patentability of genes by its revived obvious to try standard.
176
  Therefore, the 
USPTO should modify its examination guidelines regarding gene patents so 
that only genes that are nonobvious under a post-KSR standard are patentable.  
The proposed system of gene patentability addresses several major concerns 
of gene patenting and promotes societal benefits to gene research. 
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